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Abstract 
In many organizations the measurement of job performance can not rely on easily 
quantifiable information. In such cases, supervising managers often use subjective 
performance evaluations. We use laboratory experiments to study whether the way 
employees are assigned to a manager affects managers’ and co-employees’ subjective 
evaluations of employees. Employees can either be hired by the manager, explicitly not hired 
by him and nevertheless assigned to him or exogenously assigned to him. We present data 
from three different treatments. For all three treatments we find escalation bias by managers. 
Managers exhibit a positive bias towards those employees they have hired or a negative one 
towards those they have explicitly not hired. For three treatments we find that managers’ and 
employees’ biases are connected. Exogenously assigned employees are biased in favor of 
employees hired by the manager and against those explicitly not hired. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Job performance is one of the key aspects of human resources management and has attracted 
much attention from researchers and practitioners alike. The importance of job performance, 
though, is parallel to the difficulty of its measurement and consequently performance assessment 
is considered one of the most important human resources practices (Judge & Ferris, 1993). 
 
It is obviously vital for an organization that performance assessments are done accurately. In 
many organizations the measurement of job performance can not rely on easily quantifiable 
information. In such cases, supervising managers often use subjective performance evaluations. 
After many years of performance assessments in many organizations, and hundreds of papers on 
the topic, researchers and practitioners, alike, are still trying to find out how to achieve accuracy 
of subjective performance evaluations. The key issue is that subjective assessments give 
opportunity for factors like interpersonal relationships, likeability, and affect to have an effect on 
rating accuracy. 
 
In this paper we present the results from a detailed experimental study about escalation bias in 
the evaluation of employees as a consequence of hiring decisions. More specifically, we study 
whether the way employees are assigned to a manager affects managers’ and co-employees’ 
subjective evaluations of employees. Escalation bias, sometimes referred to as "irrational 
escalation of commitment", is a term frequently used in psychology, sociology, and finance to 
refer to a situation in which people who have initially made a decision that may be rational, 
follow it up with an irrational one in order to justify the initial decision and thus make 
themselves feel better about it. Staw (1976) was one of the first to point out that once a decision 
is made in our minds, we also mechanically make a psychological commitment to that decision, 
so that further decisions on the same matter are biased towards the initial decision.1 In the 
context we study, escalation bias consists in the tendency of managers who have made particular 
hiring decisions to subsequently evaluate employees who they hired in a biased manner 
                                                          
1 Escalation bias bears some relation to another cognitive bias, confirmation bias, which is the tendency to search for, interpret, or 
recall information in a way that confirms one’s beliefs of hypotheses. It is, indeed, related to escalation bias, since the escalation 
of commitment is (presumably) based on a biased reading of the case study responses of employees of different types. In our 
experiment we directly observe whether or not there are biases in evaluations, but not how these reactions come about.  
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compared to a professionally done evaluation. We will analyze the presence of both positive and 
negative escalation bias, where the first term refers to an excessively positive evaluation of hired 
employees and the second to an excessively negative evaluation of employees who were not 
hired. 
 
We use a lab experiment as our research tool, because it allows us to control for certain factors in 
a way that otherwise would not have been possible.2 In our stylized setting an employee can be 
assigned to a manager in three different ways. Employees can either be hired by the manager, 
explicitly not hired by him and nevertheless assigned to him or exogenously assigned to him. We 
study whether the way employees are assigned to a manager affects managers’ and co-
employees’ subjective evaluations of employees.  
 
During the experiment all participants in the role of the employees have to perform a task, 
consisting in reading a short two-page business case study and answering two textual questions 
on it. The employees’ task does not have a quantifiable correct answer and thus warrants a 
subjective evaluation. There isn’t just one strict way to do things. The employees know that each 
of them is given the exact same case study which is going to be evaluated by the manager and 
their peers, the other two employees in their company.  
A key feature of our experiment is that, in addition to the evaluation by managers and fellow 
employees, we include the evaluation of the task by three expert outside evaluators. These 
outside evaluations yield a baseline to which managers' and fellow employees' evaluations can be 
compared. Deviations of participants’ evaluation from the evaluations of the experts are the basis 
for our measurement of biases.  
 
There are two early precursors of our study. Bazerman et al. (1982) present data from a class-
room experiment in which participants were given the role of vice president of a large retail 
company with numerous stores. Then participants in the experimental group were asked to make 
a promotion decision to the position of manager of one of the stores, by choosing between three 
fictitious internal candidates for whom fictitious performance data was provided. After this 
                                                          
2 Falk and Heckman (2009) contains an interesting discussion of the merits of lab experiments. 
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participants were given new fictitious data that suggested that the promoted manager was not 
performing well.  
On the basis of this information participants in the experimental group had to, for the manager 
they had promoted earlier, 1) recommend an increase in pay and bonuses, 2) make an evaluation 
of the manager’s potential for being promoted, 3) forecast potential sales and profitability. In the 
control treatment, participants were informed that the decision who to promote was completed by 
a predecessor. They were given the same performance information on the manager and were 
assigned the same tasks 1), 2), and 3).  The results are consistent with escalation bias. 
Participants that had earlier chosen to promote certain employees were much more likely to later 
give them higher pay increases, give higher evaluations on managers’ potential, and forecast 
higher sales and profits than managers in the control treatment. Importantly, the experiment 
involved no incentives. Hence, the bias involves no costs for the evaluators and the evaluated 
employees. 
Bazerman et al. cannot really distinguish between a positive and a negative escalation bias, since 
the direct comparison between managers involved in hiring and not involved in hiring can not 
disentangle whether the first kind of manager is too positive or the second too negative. 
Schoorman (1988) followed up on this study, with a field experiment conducted within a real 
large public sector organization in which the presence of a positive bias could be separated from 
that of a negative bias in a particular way.  Supervisors were asked to do performance 
evaluations of their real employees.  The experiment involved supervisors evaluating (a) 
employees who they had not participated in hiring, (b) employees they had participated in hiring 
and where they did agree with the decision and (c) employees that they had participated in hiring 
and where they did not agree with the decision. The evaluations were done based on a 
performance appraisal instrument of actual performance. Comparing (a) and (b) Schoorman finds 
a positive escalation bias and comparing (a) and (c) he finds an, albeit weaker, negative 
escalation bias. As in Bazerman et al participants' decisions had no payoff consequences for 
anybody involved and, in addition, there was no outside standard of comparison for the 
evaluations. 
We think that the possible presence of escalation bias in performance evaluations is an important 
problem for companies and other organizations and that, therefore, the issue deserves a new 
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more detailed study. We highlight four important aspects of our study that go beyond the two 
seminal studies just discussed. First, in our experiment decisions will have payoff consequences 
for participants. Here we follow standard practice in experimental economics. Second, we 
present data from three different treatments in which we vary relevant factors of the environment 
to test for the robustness of behavior. In particular, we will vary the incentives and the 
experience of managers. Third, we not only analyze managers’ evaluations of employees, but 
also peer-to-peer evaluations, that is, employees’ evaluations of other employees. This will allow 
us to study whether potential manager bias can be somehow compensated by taking into account 
employees’ evaluations. Fourth, we compare managers’ and employees’ evaluations to 
evaluations of experts not directly involved in the experiment, who provide us with an external 
standard of comparison. These and other elements of our design will allow us to present a rich 
study of escalation bias.    
Using three treatments we find that managers exhibit either positive escalation bias towards the 
employees they decided to hire or negative escalation bias towards those employees they decided 
not to hire but were nevertheless assigned to them. Both the introduction of material 
consequences of behavior and of experience of managers with the same task that employees have 
to perform leads managers to become less lenient with both recommended and not-recommended 
employees. The bias is displaced from a positive to a negative one.  
 
Our results also show that the managers’ own performance in the task has an influence on the 
escalation level. Somewhat counter-intuitively managers are more biased (escalate more) when 
their performance is higher. We believe this could be due to the blind spot bias and a kind of 
over-confidence, as managers who feel confident with their performance in the task may 
automatically feel more confident with their initial hiring decision. 
 
Another contribution of our research is that it shows that escalation bias doesn’t only affect the 
people who made the initial decision, but that it can also affect others in the organization 
possibly due to conformity. In three of our treatments employees, who were not part of the 
original decision, consistently give more weight to  the information coming from the manager 
that one person had been hired over another one, than to the, in principle, more important 
information coming from their own analysis of their co-employees’ performance. In this sense, 
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we conclude that manager and employee bias may be connected and employee evaluations 
cannot serve as a counter-balance to those of managers. 
 
2. Background 
 
In this section we discuss some selected contributions to a large literature. Our review does not 
pretend to be exhaustive. Rather, we point out some connections that we think are interesting. 
 
It is widely considered unfortunate by companies that not all parts of job performance can be 
measured objectively. This is why an ever-growing number of organizations constantly use 
subjective appraisals in an attempt to provide the best possible measure of the employees’ 
performance. Gibbs et al. (2003) say that some sort of subjective performance evaluation is used 
in all jobs, and find that there is an apparent weakness in quantitative performance measures 
which puts employees at risk of downside pay, and thus subjective bonuses can be used to 
balance the previous effect. This, they state, filters out the effects of bad luck but not of good 
luck. But as mentioned earlier, these subjective parts of the evaluation can lead to a significantly 
biased evaluation (Prendergast and Topel (1996)). The reason for this is simple; there is a bias in 
subjective evaluations due to one’s own perceptual biases, but even further there seems to be a 
systematic bias due to preferences or liking towards the worker. They further state that this can 
lead to inefficient division of jobs.  This is further supported by Milkovich and Wigdor (1991) 
who find that it’s this subjective system that can possibly lead to favoritism. They state that 
supervisors many times follow their social preferences, which in turn biases the outcome of the 
evaluation.  
 
Carpenter et al. (2010) present an analysis of possible incentive effects of biased evaluations. 
They show that in a real effort experiment biased peer-to-peer evaluations can cause overall 
performance in a tournament to be lower than under piece rate. In their set-up participants 
evaluated others’ output by counting it and, subjectively by evaluating the quality of that output. 
They find that the biased evaluation of others takes place mostly through its subjective part. The 
biased evaluation leads to employees reducing their effort. 
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After some studies such as Zajonc (1980) and later Dipboye (1985) mentioned that not enough 
research focus was put on the “affect” variable, many new studies attempted to started looking at 
interpersonal affect and how it fits in the subject of performance evaluations (e. g. Cardy and 
Dobbins 1986, Shoorman 1988, Tsui and Barry 1986, Robbins & DeNisi 1994, Robbins & 
DeNisi 1998, Lefkowitz 2000) and generally concluded that affect has some effect on 
performance. One paper that is of particular interest for our work is Robbins & DeNisi (1998), 
who state that affect has a bigger effect on subjective ratings which include things like character 
traits, than to performance ratings which can be more objectively seen. They further say that the 
interpersonal affect seems to increase over time between a supervisor and his subordinates, 
which in the long term can mean an even further escalation of the bias in ratings. 
 
In the last few decades, attention has been placed on variables connected to the individual who 
does the appraisals. Lefkowitz (2000), in a literature review, summarized his findings by 
pointing out that a positive affect towards someone leads  to higher evaluations, greater halo, 
better vertical relationships, less inclination to punish subordinates, and less accuracy.  
 
Yet another topic that has received quite a bit of interest is motivation of the raters. Initial 
general consensus was that people who evaluate are motivated enough to do it accurately. This 
seems to have changed recently, as researches now for the first time asked the question if 
evaluators are really motivated to evaluate accurately (Levy & Williams, 2004). One such 
example, that touches the topic of the motivation of the rater and is relevant to our topic, is 
Villanova et al (1993). The goal of the paper was to study the level at which raters felt 
uncomfortable while appraising their subordinates. For this purpose the authors developed the 
Performance Appraisal Discomfort Scale, and found that evaluators who were higher on the 
discomfort scale were more likely to give lenient ratings as they didn’t want to deal with the 
confrontation that would arise. Similarly Klimovski and Inks (1990) have found that evaluators 
tended to give higher evaluations more when they were held accountable to the evaluatees for the 
given evaluations. This means that, for example, when evaluators expected to need to elaborate 
their decisions to their evaluatee in a face-to-face meeting, they were much more likely to distort 
their appraisal. 
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Other researchers have followed a different approach, namely trying to study the different types 
of general biases common in organizations, and through it the incentive design of the 
organizations. Key literature has mostly talked about the two most recognized types of 
evaluation bias: centrality bias and leniency bias (Ex. Prendergast, 1999). Centrality bias is the 
inclination to group performance ratings closer together than actual performance dictates which 
leads to less variance, while leniency bias provides employees with unrealistically high 
subjective performance ratings. Bol (2011) state that the causes of supervisor bias include: 
“employee performance, differences in organizational hierarchy, the financial position of the 
firm, the length of the employee-supervisor relationship, and supervisor characteristics”. Further, 
the author found that supervisor bias affects future employee incentives, in a way that leniency 
bias improves performance, while centrality affects performance negatively. Bol (2011) also 
found that each supervisor has their own utility, and thus not all supervisors bias their 
evaluations equally. Finally, the author finds that supervisors do take into account the possible 
consequences of communicating performance ratings in order to determine the extent of bias. 
 
3. Design 
 
Our design is meant to capture the essential parts of the internal company processes which we 
want to study.3 We frame the experiment and its roles “naturalistically“, naming roles, job 
positions, and tasks as they would be inside a real company.  
The situation we are interested in representing is one where a manager has to evaluate three 
employees who work for him. While one of those employees is assigned to the manager from the 
outset, the other two are assigned to him after the manager has made hiring decisions pertaining 
to the two of them. The manager will have hired one of the two employees and will have 
preferred not to hire the other employee, who will nevertheless be assigned to him. Our focus is 
on how the manager subsequently evaluates the three employees that have been assigned to him 
in different ways.  
                                                          
3  The instructions can be found in Appendix A. 
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The experiment consists of three treatments, the baseline treatment, the pay-for-performance 
treatment, the experience treatment and the pay-for-accuracy treatment. In the baseline treatment 
the manager’s evaluations will have payoff consequences for the employees but not for the 
manager. In the three subsequent treatments we will motivate the manager in two different ways: 
financially and by letting him experience the employees’ task.  
 
3.1. The Baseline Treatment 
 
Each session of the experiment has sixteen participants and consists of four parts. There is only 
one experimental round.4 
At the beginning of a session each participant is assigned to one of three types. The first type 
consists of managers (who make the hiring recommendations), the second type consists of given 
employees, employees who are told that they are already working for a manager, and the third 
type consists of potential employees (PE) who are looking for a job. In each session there are 
five managers, five already assigned employees, and six potential employees. During the first 
part of the experiment all potential employees are given a personality questionnaire to fill out. In 
the second part each manager selects one of the potential employees and recommends that he is 
hired. Throughout we will refer to the manager recommending to hire a particular employee and 
not recommending to hire the others. In the experiment it later turns out that the recommended 
employee is effectively hired, but that one of the non-recommended employees will also be hired 
and assigned to the manager in question by top management. This employee is then effectively 
assigned to him. Subsequently, another of the potential employees whom the manager decided 
not to recommend is also hired and assigned to him randomly.  
As a result of the process, each manager ends up with three employees: one who was been 
assigned to him from the start (given employee, GE), one who he recommended to hire and was 
hired (recommended employee, RE), and one whom he had the opportunity to hire but didn’t hire 
(non-recommended employee, NRE). This can be achieved because the six potential employees 
can be hired by or assigned to more than one manager, the reasons for this and their implications 
                                                          
4  We think that it is appropriate to first focus on escalation bias as a static phenomenon. Dynamic aspects of escalation bias could 
be studied in future work. 
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will be discussed in more detail in the following sections.  Participants in the role of manager 
receive a fixed sum of twelve euros. The way employees are paid is explained below. 
Participants knew from the start about the parts of the experiment. Figure 1 shows the timeline 
valid for all treatments. We now describe the four parts in more detail. 
Figure 1. Timeline  
 
 
 
 
 
 
M: Managers, GE: Given Employee, PE: Potential Employees, RE: Recommended Employee, NRE: non-
recommended employee. 
 
3.1.1. The Personality Questionnaire 
 
After the sixteen participants of an experimental session have found out what type they have 
been randomly allocated to, the six “potential employees” start filling out a personality 
questionnaire, while the other ten participants wait. At this point none of the participants has any 
information about the hiring decisions that come later.5 
The purpose of the personality questionnaire is to provide the manager with information about 
the potential employees, so that he has the impression that later he will be able to make an 
informed hiring decision. In other words, we wanted to give the manager a basis for making their 
decisions a purposeful one, yet not in a way that he would give them full information on exactly 
how hired employees would perform in the task ahead. Feiler at al. (2013) find that individuals in 
                                                          
5 Managers and potential employees knew the content of the questionnaire; given employees did not. 
Initial assignment 
Manager 
GE 
PE 
Personality 
Questionnaire 
Hiring Process 
RE added 
NRE randomly added 
Task 
Evaluation 
Manager 
All Employees 
External 
Compensation 
Manager 
All Employees 
(ev. contingent) 
 
 
10 
environments which have censored information tend to rely too heavily on the censored 
information they have, causing them to form biased beliefs. 
The personality test provided is a BFI-10 test, a 10-item short version of a widely used and 
recognized Big Five Inventory Test, with the Big Five being: openness, conscientiousness, 
extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism. The official Spanish translation of the test can be 
found in Appendix B. We opted for this test because of its short length, as this meant that the 
other participants who didn’t have to make a decision at this stage didn’t have to sit idly for long. 
Despite its brevity, the test has been found to possess adequate psychometric properties. 
(Rammstedt and John (2007)).  
 
3.1.2. The Hiring Process 
 
In the second part of the experiment each of the five managers of a session is given the 
personality test answers of the six potential employees that are looking for a job in his company. 
Here it is important to note that the personality test results were purposefully not aggregated (as 
is often done), so the managers could see all 10 questions and each corresponding answer. The 
reason we did this is because it further differentiates the six candidates, and mimics a “question 
and answer” structure akin to that of a real-world interview situation. 
The manager is instructed that there are two open positions in his department and that he can 
recommend one of the six candidates, who will then be hired. Participants are told that the other 
hiring decision will be made by top management. Since the manager sees the questionnaire 
responses of all potential employees in his company, it is possible that more than one manager 
decides to hire the same employee. The reason we allow for this is so that every manager gets to 
choose from an equal amount of potential employees, while keeping the simplicity of not having 
to send anyone home in the middle of each session, or have them wait idly for a long time. 
Once managers have made their hiring decisions they are told which one of the remaining five 
potential employees top management has decided to hire and assign to them. The top 
management hiring decision is in fact a randomly selected potential employee who has not been 
hired by any of the five managers. In the end all six potential employees are hired either as a first 
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choice by the hiring manager, or as a second choice by top management. Note that the 
experiment is designed in such a way that the same potential employee cannot be both a 
recommended employee and a non-recommended employee in different groups. The given 
employee is distinct for each of the managers. 
At the very end of this stage the six potential employees are informed about whether they have 
been hired and whether they are first choice picks hired directly by the hiring manager 
(recommended employee, RE) or not (non-recommended employee, NRE). Now every manager 
has three employees working for him, one given employee, one recommended employee, and 
one non-recommended employee. 
With this design it is possible for both RE’s & NRE’s to be hired into two different firms. For 
each of the participants which are hired into two or more firms we randomly randomly 
determined a “primary” firm. They only grade other employees in this firm, and get paid 
according to their grade in the same firm (as you will see below). These participants are not 
informed that they have been selected by two or more managers, as this is solely a procedural 
design decision of the experiment, for the reasons explained above, which has no impact on the 
research questions at hand. No participant asked us about this issue. 
 
3.1.3. The Task 
 
During the third part of the experiment all employees, regardless of how they were assigned to 
their managers, are given the same task to perform individually. The task consists of reading a 
short two-page business case and privately answering two questions about it that do not have 
quantifiable correct answers. This is done in order to mimic real life company problems where 
there isn’t just one strict way to get things done. The responses to this case study warrant a 
subjective evaluation.  
The English translation of the case study can be found in Appendix C. The case study refers to a 
company and its plan to perform an expansion strategy. At the end of the description of the case, 
there are two questions each participant in the potential employee role has to answer.  
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1. Comment on the relationship between quantity and quality. Do you think that there is 
always an inverse relationship between both of them? 
 
2. Which objectives is this expansion plan pursuing? 
 
The employees know that each of them is given the exact same case study which is going to be 
evaluated by the manager and their peers, the other two employees in their company. They are 
also told that their pay will be based solely on the manager’s relativeevaluation of their answers. 
In addition, they also know that the manager has no financial incentives in this baseline 
treatment. 
 
3.1.4. The Evaluation of the Task by Managers and Employees 
 
In this part of the experiment managers are shown the answers to the two open-ended textual 
questions on the case study provided in the previous part.  
They see the answers of all three of their employees simultaneously and are asked to evaluate 
each employee’s performance on a scale of 0-100.  At the same time than the manager, each 
employee is shown the answers of the other two employees working under the same manager 
and asked to evaluate them on a scale from 0-100. Importantly, managers and employees know 
to what type of employee each case study belongs to. 
In the case that more than one manager decides to hire the same participant or the same person is 
hired by more than one top management, that person's task is evaluated by all the managers and 
co-employees in all groups in which he has been hired. Neither the managers nor the person in 
question is told that he is now a participant in multiple groups. To determine his final 
compensation a group is chosen at random (from the ones he is in).  
 
At the end of the session 36 euros are proportionally split between each of the three employees 
working under a manager, with the proportions based solely on the score of each of the 
employees evaluated by each manager. For example, if the given employee received a grade of 
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80, and the recommended and non-recommended employees both received a grade of 40, the 
given employee will receive 18 euros in compensation while the other two will receive 9 euros 
each. Recall that in this first baseline treatment the manager is paid a fixed sum of 12 euros. The 
evaluations made by employees had no payoff consequences for managers or employees. 
 
3.1.5. The External Evaluation 
 
With this evaluation the experimental sessions of the baseline treatment formally finish. After the 
session all of the employees’ case study answers were taken, secretly coded, and given to three 
external evaluators to grade. The external evaluators were the same for all sessions of three of 
the treatments. They were PhD students in business economics, who do research in and teach 
courses in business economics, management and related subjects at the Universitat Autonoma de 
Barcelona. In particular, they have experience in evaluating students’ answers to case studies like 
the one we use in the experiment. The external evaluators do not participate in the experiment 
and have no way to know which answer belongs to which person, type, or group. Just like the 
managers within the experiment, they grade the answers with a score from 0-100. Because these 
external evaluators are experts and have no means to be biased in any way we regard their score 
to be a proxy variable for employees’ real performance.6 For the third treatment (conducted after 
the three first ones) one of the evaluators was the same as before and the other two were assistant 
professors in business.  
The comparison between the average grade given by the three external evaluators and by the 
managers and employees will be the basis for our analysis of escalation in the results section. 
This is an important feature of our experiment. 
 
3.2. The Experience Treatment 
 
                                                          
6 The external evaluators first evaluated the given employees. Then they evaluated the remaining employees in an 
effectively random order, which corresponded to the random seating order in the lab. 
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Our second treatment, the experience treatment, is identical to the baseline treatment introduced 
in section 3.1, with the exception that managers perform the same task as the employees and at 
the same time. Once the managers have performed the task they evaluate their employees, and 
the employees do the peer-to-peer evaluations. Managers and employees are paid just as in the 
baseline treatment. After the experiment all tasks (case study answers), including the managers’, 
are evaluated by the external evaluators, who are not present during the sessions. These 
evaluations don’t have any payoff consequences, but are the basis for our analysis of escalation 
bias. 
 
3.3. The Pay-for-Accuracy Treatment 
 
The main difference of this treatment with respect to the baseline is that managers don’t obtain a 
fixed payment. A manager’s payment now depends on how the evaluation of an employee by the 
manager deviates from that of the average of the external evaluators. The rationale behind this 
treatment is that at some point higher management will find out whether a manager is able to 
accurately evaluate employees and will be rewarded for it. The payoff function that we use is the 
following:  
Manager Pay = 30 - |Manager’s grade of his employee – Externals’ grade of that same 
employee|(Averaged for all 3 employees). 
We chose the value of the first term to be 30, using the data from the first three treatments, so as 
to obtain average manager earnings of 12, as in the other three treatments. 
 
 
4. Hypotheses 
In this section we propose null and alternative hypotheses both for manager and employee 
escalation biases. In both cases, the hypotheses we formulate apply to all treatments. However, 
the rationales behind the hypotheses differ between treatments. The alternative hypotheses we 
present are not based on any formal model of behaviour. Rather, they encapsulate behavioural 
biases that have been observed in previous work. 
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4. 1. Manager Bias 
Ideally a performance evaluation should be a true measure of performance of an individual 
employee. That is, any external factor, in particular, the fact that a manager has hired a particular 
employee should not affect the performance evaluation. Thus the following null hypothesis: 
H10: Managers evaluate their employees in an unbiased way, independently of how employees 
were hired into the company. 
 
This hypothesis posits what can be considered perfectly rational behavior in our context. 
However, previous work has shown that people’s decision making process is potentially 
influenced by their previous decisions. Whenever a manager hires an applicant, he must have 
certain reasons and criteria by which he has made that decision. This reasoning often remains as 
an anchor in people's minds, as at least a moderate amount of effort and time was spent into this 
decision process.  
 
The main reason why we believe that a manager might have a positive bias towards the 
employee he has personally hired is because that employee represents his choice, which he may 
feel obliged to defend. Staw (1981) finds that one’s decision to stick to an unfavorable course of 
action is helped by the need to preserve one-self.  Managers are thus likely to distort unfavorable 
information though self-preservation defense mechanisms. Following the notion that humans 
find it hard to admit their mistakes yet are relatively quick to praise their good decisions, the 
alternative hypotheses proposes that the performance appraising manager is going to show a bias 
towards his employees.7 We formulate two alternative hypotheses, one for positive bias and one 
for negative bias: 
 
H1a: Managers have a positive bias towards the employees they decided to hire. 
                                                          
7 Another reason for a manager bias is likability. Managers make decisions on the basis of likeability and we know from earlier 
studies by psychologists that there is a clear connection between likability, attribution, and ratings.  Regan et al. (1974) examined 
the link between liking and attribution. They found that rater’s attributions for ratee performance varied, depending on their 
liking for the ratee. In our setting, it is not easy that managers develop a liking for the employee he recommends. However, it can 
not be excluded. 
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H1b: Managers have a negative bias towards the employees they decided not to hire but were 
hired by a third party. 
 
Both the experience and the pay-for-accuracy treatments introduce what a priori could be seen as 
factors moderating the tendency towards biased evaluations.  
 
In the experience treatment managers perform the task at the same time as the employees. We 
conjectured that by performing the task they would get a better feel for what it entails to perform 
it well, and would therefore be less likely to evaluate employees in a biased way. Tyler et al. 
(1999) find that the psychology of preexisting preferences and post-experience evaluations will 
differ. This suggests to us that managers may be less lenient towards the recommended 
employees in the experience treatment because by going through the same experience they 
themselves have had to think more deeply about what the correct answer might be and at the end 
are more knowledgeable about the question, leading to more unbiased evaluations. 
In the pay-for-accuracy treatment the manager’s payment depends on how the evaluation of an 
employee by the manager deviates from that of the average of the external evaluators. Our 
expectation was that this treatment, similarly to the previous one, would give a better chance to 
the null with respect to the biases presented in the alternative hypotheses above.    
In the experience treatment we can study an additional issue. The literature on effort tells us that 
people value their effort higher than others’ efforts, so having put in a higher effort to solve the 
task themselves; they are likely to be less lenient towards employees who don’t put much effort 
into solving the task. In particular, Franco-Watkins et al. (2011) found that when more effort is 
put in, there is a tendency to put a higher monetary value on that effort exerted as well as to 
compensate oneself and others differently in comparison to say windfall gains were not much 
effort is put in.  
In our framework we can analyse whether the grade that managers obtain in the task has a 
significant effect on the way they grade others. Ideally, own performance should have no effect 
on evaluations.  
 
 
17 
One may also conjecture that managers who perform better in the task are less likely to be biased 
(both positively and negatively) towards their employees. If a manager performs better in the 
task it means that a) he understands the topic better and/or b) he has put more effort into the task. 
Understanding the task better should help in making better evaluation decisions, and having put 
more of his own effort into a task likely means that managers could find it harder to grade 
anyone higher than what they actually deserve. This is captured in the following null hypothesis: 
H20: Managers’ performance score in the task does not affect their biases in the performance 
evaluations.  
A few studies suggest that that the opposite might happen, namely that better performers may not 
have an advantage when dealing with biases. It has been found that it is much harder to realize a 
bias in one’s own decisions and action, than it is in the decision and actions of others. This is 
what is called a “bias blind spot,” explored in Pronin, Lin and Ross (2002). West et al. (2012) 
find that bias blind spots are not lessened by measures of cognitive ability (cognitive scores, SAT 
scores etc.). Thus, we formulate the following alternative: 
H2a: Managers’ performance score in the task does affect their biases in the performance 
evaluations.  
 
4.2. Employee Bias 
 
Gómez-Mejía et al. (2005) discuss the extensive use in companies of peer-to-peer as well as 360 
degree evaluations. Moreover, Baron and Kreps (1999) and Lazear (1998,) consider that 
including peers, clients and subordinates increases validity, reliability and legitimacy of the 
evaluation system. Its wide use and its supposed benefits justify our decision to include peer-to 
peer evaluation in this experiment. We were interested in seeing whether employees could also 
be affected by the way their co-workers have been hired into the company, even though they are 
not directly involved. If this were the case, it would suggest that such evaluations should be used 
with caution.  
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Similarly to the case of manager evaluations, ideally peer-to-peer evaluations should not be 
influenced by anything other than the performance of their co-employees. As for managers we 
posit a null hypothesis of no bias, which pertains to all three treatments: 
 
H30: Employees evaluate their co-employees in an unbiased way, independently of how co-
employees were hired. 
 
However, there are several potential influences of the hiring process on employees’ peer-to-peer 
evaluations. One of these influences is conformism, the tendency to follow others’ opinions and 
decisions when there is real or perceived pressure by these others (Cialdini and Trost, 1998). 
Since the classic experiments reported by Asch (1955), conformism has been a topic analyzed 
for its wide implications in economics and management. Akerlof (1997) introduces a model 
where individuals want to conform, more in the sense of normative influence, when the concern 
to obtain approval of others is important. Even in the context of recruiting, Granovetter (2005) 
discusses several studies where workers entering a firm through recommendations appear to be 
more productive.8  
 
In our experiment, even though employees didn’t make hiring decisions, they were informed 
about the hiring decisions of their manager. Conformity would lead to all employees favoring the 
recommended employee and disfavoring the non-recommended employee. 
 
Another influence is that non recommended employees are likely to be dissatisfied because they 
weren’t hired by the evaluating manager and therefore may exhibit this dissatisfaction by 
punishing the other employees. This is a form of displaced aggression. If NRE perform better in 
the task a positive bias towards them may be found in the GE ratings, if that causes them to 
believe that a correct hiring decision was not made by the manager. Due to the contradicting 
factors that may affect the peer-to-peer evaluations we formulate the following alternative 
hypothesis, which pertain to all three treatments: 
                                                          
8 Bikhchandani et al. (1992) and Banerjee (1992) study a kind of conformity that arises rationally. In their models, 
agents make decisions sequentially observing both a private signal and the decisions of those who go before them. 
They found that agents choose to put aside the signals which they receive and follow their predecessors' decisions, 
even when their own signals offer a much stronger clue of what the correct decision is, an indication of 
informational influence. 
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H3a: Recommended Employees are biased by the way they and other employees have been hired 
into the company. 
 
H3b: Non Recommended Employees are biased by the way they and other employees have been 
hired into the company. 
 
H3c: Given Employees are biased by the way other employees have been hired into the 
company. 
 
 
5. Procedures 
 
We conducted six sessions with each of the three treatments. The average running time of the 
first and third treatments was one hour, while it was an hour and 30 minutes for the second 
treatment, due to the presence of the outside evaluators in the session. The experiment was 
conducted at two of the computer rooms of the Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona and 
participants were undergraduate students from the university. The z-tree software was used to 
run the experiment (Fischbacher, 1999). 
  
In each of the twenty-four sessions there are sixteen participants. We therefore have 384 
participants, of which 120 are managers, 120 are given employees, and 144 are potential 
employees. Of the participants 28% are business or economics students, 16% study natural 
sciences, 11% study psychology, sociology and anthropology, 8% major in engineering, maths, 
or computer sciences, 6% major in medicinal studies, and the rest are split between other various 
disciplines. 
 
 
6. Results 
 
We start with a brief analysis of the characteristics of recommended employees, in terms of their 
responses to the questionnaire. This is done for all treatments together, since the first stage of the 
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experiment is the same for all treatments. After that we discuss the results of manager and 
employee evaluations treatment by treatment.  
 
 
6.1. Who Gets and Recommended and hence Hired 
 
Table 1 shows the results of two ordered probit regressions. In both regressions the dependent 
variable “Recommendedby2+” corresponds to employees who have been recommended by two 
or more managers. In specification 1 the exogenous variables correspond to the ten questions of 
the personality questionnaire. Some of the variables have what can be considered to be the 
expected effect, for example, thoroughness has a positive and significant effect. However, some 
of the other effects are less natural, for example laziness has a negative but not significant effect. 
We show the results of this specification, but the more meaningful results correspond to 
specification 2.  This specification uses as exogenous variables the big five categories which can 
be computed from the responses to the ten original questions. Here one can see that participants 
in the role of the manager hire employees in a meaningful way. Agreeableness and 
conscientiousness have a strongly significant positive effect, while neuroticism and, perhaps 
more surprisingly, extraversion have significant negative impacts. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Table 2 shows the results of OLS regressions. In both regressions the dependent variable 
“Performance” corresponds to employees’ score (between 0 and 100). The independent variables 
are the same as in Table A. In the regression using the original categories of the questionnaire 
there are some significant effects, but not in the regression using the big five. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
Our summary of this evidence is that managers seem to make their recommendation choices in a 
thoughtful manner, but that the responses to the questionnaire do not have an impact of 
employees’ performance.9  
                                                          
9 To avoid an additional effects of liking we did not ask managers to fill out the personality questionnaire. 
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6.2. Results of the Baseline Treatment 
 
Table 3 reports the means of the external evaluations, manager evaluations as well as the three 
distinct peer-to peer-evaluations, where each type of employee does not evaluate the own type.10  
As can be seen from the last row in the table there are differences in the mean grades for the 
different types of evaluators.  One can see that grades given by the externals are lower than those 
for the managers, perhaps due to higher standards of the experts. This difference between the 
outside evaluators and the managers holds for all three types of employees, with the difference 
for the recommended employee being the largest.  
Comparing the evaluations of the three types of employees one can see that the average grade 
given by the non-recommended employee is lower than for the other two types of employees, 
reflecting perhaps a general dissatisfaction for not having been recommended by the 
corresponding manager. All mentioned results so far are statistically significant, but also 
irrelevant as these results are not standardized. They do, however, help in understanding what is 
going behind the standardized results we are going to present.  
We now move to the statistical tests for escalation bias. Given the features of our design we need 
to standardize the evaluation grades. The way we standardize is by using proportions of grades 
with respect to an appropriate aggregate.11 For manager evaluations we express their grade of 
specific employees as a proportion of the sum of the grades for all three employees. This 
standardization gives rise to two new variables, namely “RE/(RE+NRE+GE)” and 
“NRE/(RE+NRE+GE)” The first variable corresponds to the proportion of the manager 
evaluation of the recommended employee with respect to that of the sum of all employees. The 
second variable similarly corresponds to the proportion of the evaluation of the non -
recommended employee with respect to the sum of the evaluations of all three employees.  Given 
the directional character of the alternative hypotheses H1a and H1b, we will use one-sided tests 
to evaluate them. 
 
                                                          
10 Appendix D gives more information on all the evaluations of the externals. 
11 We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this way of standardizing. 
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For the peer-to-peer evaluations, we base our statistical analysis on three proportions. The first 
pertains to the grading by the recommended employee of the non-recommended employee and is 
given by NRE/ (NRE+GE), where the grade is now standardized by the sum of the grades of the 
two other employees. Similarly, we will study the grades given by the non-recommended 
employee to the recommended employee by using the proportion RE/ (RE+GE) and the grade 
given by the given employee to the recommended employee by using RE/ (RE+NRE). Given the 
more exploratory character of the hypotheses pertaining to employee behavior we will use two-
sided tests in this case. 
Table 3. Mean Grades (Baseline Treatment) 
  External Evaluates Manager Evaluates GE Evaluates RE Evaluates NRE Evaluates Mean 
GE 59,88 64,97   59,21 52,18 59,06 
RE 55,96 72,00 67,10   55,06 62,53 
NRE 56,19 62,29 53,11 62,00   58,40 
Mean Grade 57,34 66,42 60,11 60,61 53,62 59,62 
 
Figures 2 and 3 show average proportions in the standardized evaluations for managers and 
employees respectively, together with the corresponding comparisons with the evaluations of the 
external evaluators, where the stars next to the different proportions express the level of 
significance.12 Starting with Figure 2, on average managers grade recommended employees 
relatively higher than the external evaluators consider that the given employees performed better. 
Recall that external evaluators do not know which case study response belongs to which type of 
employee, so that they have no basis for discrimination.   
The statistical backing for the manager bias in this treatment comes from the results of a one-
tailed Wilcoxon signed-rank test. The test finds a significant difference in the proportions of the 
grades of managers and externals with a p=0.017. Remember that the given employee did not 
take part in the hiring process and, therefore, there was no obvious basis for any bias towards 
them. Additionally we know from Table 3 that on average managers did not evaluate the given 
employees lower than the external evaluators, so that the higher difference in the proportions 
comes from the higher grade given to the recommended employee and the lower grade given to 
the recommended employee by the managers. For the baseline treatment our evidence is 
                                                          
12 Appendix E shows figures corresponding to an alternative method of standardization based on differences. 
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consistent with H1a; managers have a positive bias towards employees who they have personally 
decided to hire.  
We move on to the last two bars of Figure 2 to check for the presence of a negative bias. 
Managers evaluate non-recommended employees lower than the externals. However, the one-
tailed Wilcoxon signed-rank test for our second hypothesis finds a p=0.1706. We can not reject 
the null hypothesis in favor of H1b, there is no significant negative bias of evaluating managers 
towards employees explicitly not hired by managers but nevertheless assigned to them. 
Figures 2&3 
 
In Figure 3 one can see the information pertaining to the relevant proportions for the peer-to-peer 
evaluations where in parentheses we denote which type of employee has performed the 
evaluations in each case. These are again compared to the external evaluators’ scores of the 
identical pairs that each employee evaluated. The biggest difference in the peer-to-peer 
evaluations can be seen in the last two bars of Figure 3 which represent the ratings of given 
employees. 
For the differences in proportions we ran two-tailed Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. All three types 
of employees grade the other two employees in their branch, all of which may be affected 
differently by the manager’s decision in the hiring stage.  For this reason we believe that a two-
tailed test is the most appropriate for all peer-to-peer evaluations since a priori a possible bias 
can go in either direction. We found that given employees evaluated recommended employees 
relatively higher, a result which is statistically significant (p=0,0015). The result shows that 
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existing employees working under a manager tend to be affected by decisions made by their 
manager, to a point that their evaluations become very biased, consistent with the notion of 
conformity discussed above. 
For the evaluations done by the recommended we don’t find significant differences with respect 
to outside evaluators (p=0.7020).13 Recommended Employees have graded their two co-workers 
in an unbiased way. We next look at the evaluations done by the NRE. Although the pattern of 
differences is the same as for the manager, the Wilcoxon test shows that the result is not 
significant though (p=0,2342). This could be due to the tendency towards conformity being 
compensated by a pull in the other direction, because of the non-recommended employees’ 
dissatisfaction with not having being selected.  
Therefore it is safe to conclude that employees hired by the manager are not affected by this 
hiring decision when evaluating their peers.  
In summary, for the baseline treatment we find that for the manager the evidence is consistent 
with positive escalation bias but not with negative escalation bias. In addition we find a bias in 
the peer-to-peer evaluations: the given employee biases his evaluation in favor of the 
recommended employee and against the non-recommended employee. 
The next treatment is meant to be an environment where the biases are more difficult to arise. 
  
6.3. Results of the Experience Treatment 
 
Table 5 shows the mean grades of the experience treatment. As in the two previous treatments 
managers grade on average higher than the external evaluators. Looking at the managers grading 
we can see that the pattern of the means is very similar to that of the second treatment. The non-
recommended employees receive by far the lowest average grade.14 Looking at the peer-to-peer 
evaluation means one can see that they are also similar to those of the second treatment. The 
biggest two differences come from the peer-to-peer evaluations of RE and GE, with both 
evaluating the NRE far lower than then each other. The main discrepancy with respect to the 
                                                          
13 The number of observations is different between managers and given employees on one side and the other types of employees 
on the other side. 
14 Managers’ average grade in their task was 56.17, which was slightly lower than the mean grade. 
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pattern for the pay-for-performance treatment is the non-recommended employees' evaluation of 
the recommended employee.  
Table 4. Mean Grades (Experience Treatment) 
  External Evaluates Manager Evaluates GE Evaluates RE Evaluates NRE Evaluates Mean 
GE 60,00 71,83   65,31 60,20 64,34 
RE 59,28 65,57 63,27   57,45 61,39 
NRE 56,39 59,57 52,53 53,75   55,56 
Mean Grade 58,56 65,66 57,90 59,53 58,83 60,09 
 
For managers' evaluations, the statistical results are qualitatively the same as for the previous 
treatment. The first two bars of Figure 6 show the managers’ and the external evaluator’s mean 
evaluations of the RE in relation to the sum of evaluations. We find no significant difference 
between managers’ and external evaluators’ evaluations; a one-tailed Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
finds p=0.4346. For the 30 managers of this treatment, fourteen managers scored a higher 
proportion in favor of the RE than the externals and fourteen scored a lower proportion than the 
externals, and there were 2 ties. In summary, when managers perform the task beforehand they 
lose the positive bias towards the RE. 
The last two bars of Figure 6 show the average proportions for the evaluations of the NRE.  As 
for the second treatment we find that the positive bias towards the RE observed in the baseline 
treatment disappears and a negative bias towards the NRE develops. Again the result is 
significant; the one-tailed Wilcoxon signed-rank test finds a weak statistical significance of 
p=0.0749. We therefore reject the null of no bias in this case. 
Overall, we find that, as for the pay-for-performance treatment managers’ evaluation bias is 
displaced from a positive bias towards the RE to a negative bias towards the NRE. 
As discussed in section 4.1 we can also study whether the manager’s own performance has an 
effect on the level of bias he shows in his evaluations. Perhaps surprisingly, we find that when 
managers perform better in the task they are more likely to be biased. An OLS regression of the 
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sum of  the RE and the NRE biases on the managers’ grade in the case study finds a positive 
coefficient of 0.003 (p=0.005).15 Hence, we reject the null in favor of H2a.  
Figures 4&5 
 
Figure 7 shows the peer to peer evaluation descriptives for the third treatment. From it yet again 
we see very similar results to the previous treatments. The only difference which is significant is 
the grading of the given employees, which again favors the RE over the NRE. The statistical 
backing for the GE bias comes from the results of a two-tailed Wilcoxon signed-rank test, which 
finds p= 0.011. The grading of the GE has been the most constant result in this experiment, not 
changing throughout the 3 treatments. The given employees have constantly graded the NRE 
lower than the GE, in true conformist fashion, compared to the grading of the outside evaluators. 
This will change in the third treatment to which we move now. 
 
6.4. Results of the Pay-for-Accuracy Treatment 
 
Table 6 shows average grades for the pay-for-accuracy treatment and Figures 8 and 9 show the 
average proportions that we use in our statistical tests. 
                                                          
15 More specifically we regress |[RE/(RE+NRE+GE) by Man.] – [RE/(RE+NRE+GE) by Ext.]|+ 
|[NRE/(RE+NRE+GE) by Man.] – [NRE/(RE+NRE+GE) by Ext.]| on the manager’s grade for the case study. We 
have 30 observations and the R-squared = 0.244. 
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Table 5. Mean Grades (Pay-for-Accuracy Treatment) 
  External Evaluates Manager Evaluates GE Evaluates RE Evaluates NRE Evaluates Mean 
GE 54,93 65,93   75,65 63,74 65,06 
RE 63,00 70,33 67,20   65,63 66,54 
NRE 54,09 56,27 57,47 51,94 
 
54,94 
Mean Grade 57,34 64,18 62,33 63,79 64,68 62,47 
 
As for treatments two and three, two-tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum tests find that differences 
between managers’ and externals’ evaluations are not significant for RE/(RE+NRE+GE), with a 
p=0.3365, while they are significant for NRE/(RE+NRE+GE), p=0.010. For peer-to-peer 
evaluations we do not find results consistent with those of the previous three treatments. We find 
that the RE now grades the NRE significantly higher than the GE, with p=0.0012. The NRE also 
grades the RE significantly higher than the GE, although with p=0.0765. Finally, the GE does 
not grade the RE higher than the RE. We do not have a good explanation for why the pattern of 
the peer-to-peer evaluations is different than for the other three cases. Employees may realize 
that managers now have clear incentives to not be biased and that leads to the elimination of the 
influence of managers’ evaluations on those of the employees.16   
Figures 6&7 
 
 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
16 We conducted an additional treatment, the pay-for performance treatment in which managers were paid depending 
on how the external evaluators evaluate the three employees that work for them. This procedure was meant to 
represent the fact that managers’ income may depend on the actual future performance of those employees that they 
give support to. In the review process it became clear that this treatment was a very unsatisfactory way of capturing 
a dynamic phenomenon in a static environment. The interested reader can find more detail on this treatment as well 
the results in the working paper: 
http://www.iae.csic.es/investigadorPersonWorkingPapers.php?idinvestigador=7&lang=ing 
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We set out to produce a detailed experimental study of hiring and escalation bias in subjective 
performance evaluations. More broadly, our aim was to contribute to the growing experimental 
and behavioral literature that studies managerial problems as in recent work by Brandts and Solà 
(2010), Harbring and Irlenbusch (2011), Berger, Harbring and Sliwka (2013) and Corgnet and 
Hernan (2014). 
 
Using three treatments we find that managers exhibit either positive escalation bias towards the 
employees they decided to hire or negative escalation bias towards those employees they decided 
not to hire but were nevertheless assigned to them. Both the introduction of material 
consequences and of experience of managers with the same task that employees have to perform 
does not eliminate managers’ bias. What we observe is that the bias moves from being a positive 
bias towards recommended employees to a negative one for non-recommended employees.   
 
Our results in one of the treatments also show that managers’ own performance in the task has an 
influence on the escalation level. Perhaps surprisingly, managers are more biased (escalate more) 
when their performance is higher. This result may be attributed to the blind spot bias and a kind 
of over-confidence, as managers who feel confident with their performance in the task may at the 
same time feel more confident with their initial hiring decision. This evidence is in accordance 
with some recent evidence pertaining to biases of development professionals reported in the 
recent World Development Report (2015) of the World Bank. 
 
Another contribution of our research is that it shows that escalation bias doesn’t only affect the 
people who made the initial decision, but that it can also affect others in the organization 
possibly due to conformity. In three of the treatments, employees who were not part of the 
original decision consistently give more weight to  the information coming from the manager 
that one person had been hired over another one, than to the, in principle, more important 
information coming from their own analysis of their co-employees’ performance. This suggests 
that manager and employee bias are connected and employee evaluations cannot serve as a 
counter-balance to those of managers. However, in the third of our treatments we find a different 
pattern for the peer-to-peer evaluations, which is not easy to explain. 
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The implications of the findings go beyond a potential bias in performance evaluations. They 
show just how easily previous decisions can contribute to making us make irrational decisions 
subsequently. In addition, we find that the actions of others, at least of those perceived to have 
higher positions, can influence people around them to also be biased, without there even being 
direct contact between them.  
 
Even though this paper covers several scenarios in which escalation bias might have an effect on 
performance evaluations, we believe that it is only the first step in order to understand the full 
effect that escalation bias has on the performance and dynamics of a work-group. With this aim 
in mind we propose that further research is done with a focus on three main issues: 1) testing 
escalation-bias’s strength over time in a repeated game scenario; 2) testing employees’ behaviour 
once they have been the subject of a positive or negative bias by an evaluating manager; and 3) 
studying the effects of different 360 degrees evaluation schemes involving incentives. 
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Table 1: Ordered Probit regressions relating the number of recommendations to the responses in 
the personality questionnaire. 
 
 
 
Table 2: OLS regressions relating the answers in the questionnaire to performance. 
  
(1) 
Independent variables 
(1) 
Recommby2+ 
(2) 
Independent variables 
(2) 
Recommby2+ 
Reserved .176 
(.117) 
Extraversion -.174** 
(.071) 
Trusting .210* 
(.118) 
Agreeableness .245*** 
(.078) 
Lazy -.210 
(.159) 
Conscientiousness .277*** 
(.088) 
Relaxed .640*** 
(.160) 
Neuroticism -.230*** 
(.065) 
Artistic -.105 
(.087) 
Openness .101 
(.068) 
Outgoing -.126 
(.134) 
- - 
Finds faults -.262** 
(.106) 
- - 
Thorough .347** 
(.158) 
- - 
Nervous .073 
(.136) 
- - 
Imaginative .218 
(.151) 
- - 
N 144 - 144 
R-square 0.200 - 0.239 
 (1) 
Independent variables 
(1) 
Performance 
(2) 
Independent variables 
(2) 
Performance 
Reserved -.065 
(1.014) 
Extraversion .546 
(.638) 
Trusting .769 
(1.026) 
Agreeableness .287 
(.699) 
Lazy 1.840 
(1.290) 
Conscientiousness .911 
(.779) 
Relaxed 1.105 
(1.173) 
Neuroticism -.373 
(.569) 
Artistic -.903 
(.774) 
Openness .039 
(.636) 
Outgoing 2.329** 
(1.126) 
- - 
Finds faults -.496 
(.891) 
- - 
Thorough 4.209*** 
(1.307) 
- - 
Nervous .038 
(1.119) 
- - 
Imaginative -2.266* 
(1.290) 
- - 
Constant 33.395*** 
(11.416) 
 46.641*** 
(10.080) 
N 144 - 144 
R-square 0.122 - 0.031 
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Appendix A.  Instructions 
 
ALL TEXT IN CAPITAL LETTERS (LIKE THIS ONE) IS ADDED FOR READERS 
AND DOES NOT BELONG TO THE ORIGINAL INSTRUCTIONS 
1. GENERAL. ALL PARTICIPANTS 
Instructions 
Welcome and thank you very much for your disposition to participate in this experiment. You 
will receive a minimum of 5 euros for participating in this experiment. Any contact to other 
participants in this room is from now on not allowed any more. If you have questions, raise your 
hand and we will come to your seat.  
General information 
For the purpose of this experiment you will be randomly split into 3 groups: Managers, 
Employees, and Potential Employees. The experiment starts off with 5 different companies all of 
which have a separate manager and 1 employee already working for each of those managers, the 
Assigned Worker. Each firm will end up with a Manager, a Given Employee, and two additional 
workers selected between the Potential Employees. 
First Stage 
The first step of the experiment is a hiring process where managers will choose which of the 
Potential Employees to hire, having the results of a personality test that will be conducted. Each 
firm will ultimately select two of the Potential Employees, but the Manager will only be able to 
select one Potential Employee. 
Each potential employee will answer a standard test asking how the person identifies herself with 
respect to some statements concerning personality traits. Nobody in the experiment will know 
who gave what answers; we will identify answers with an anonymous code. Once Managers see 
the answers, each Manager will be able to select one Potential Employee for her firm, the 
Recommended Employee. 
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Finally the firm will be composed by a Manager, a Given Employee, A Recommended 
Employee and a non-recommended employee, randomly assigned among those no selected by 
the manager of the firm. 
Following this all employees (newly hired and old) will have to do a task which will be 
evaluated by the manager. 
Second stage 
[IN BASELINE TREATMENT AND PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE TREATMENT] 
In this stage, each employee will develop an activity that will be later evaluated by the Manager 
in her firm as well as by the coworkers. ] 
[IN EXPERIENCE TREATMENT] 
[In this stage everybody, Managers and Employees will develop an activity] 
AL TREATMENTS 
This activity will consist of answering two questions on a case study. These answers would allow 
the firm and the Manager specifically take the right decisions in his activity.  
Third stage 
In this stage Managers will evaluate the answers of their employees. Compensation for 
employees will depend only upon the relative evaluation of the answers to the case study by the 
Manager. Specifically, 36 euros will be distributed among the three workers under the evaluation 
of a manager considering the three evaluations. The split is not going to be in equal shares but 
relative to their performance, meaning how the manager evaluates the task they have just done. 
Every employee will receive at least 5 euros.  
In addition, each employee will also evaluate her coworkers, but this evaluation will not affect 
compensation.  
Answers by employees will also be evaluated by an external organization. 
[BASELINE TREATMENT 
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Compensation to the manager will be a fixed amount of 12 euros.] 
[PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE TREATMENT 
Compensation to the manager will be one third of the mean evaluation that the external 
organization will do of the three employees. That is, if the mean evaluation by the external 
organization was 60 points, the manager will receive 20 euros.] 
[EXPERIENCE TREATMENT 
Compensation to the manager will be a fixed amount of 12 euros.] 
ALL TREATMENTS 
Concluding remarks 
Keep in mind that your answers to the questionnaires as well as during the subsequent 
experiments will of-course be treated anonymously. As codes are used for identity nobody 
except the experimenters will know exactly which task results, and personality questionnaires 
belong to you. 
The actual experiment starts now. Please continue to be quiet and avoid any communication with 
the other participants. If you have questions, please raise your hand.  
INSTRUCTIONS INCLUDED IN THE PROGRAM AS THE EXPERIMENT UNFOLDS 
2. BEFORE PERSONALITY QUESTIONNAIRE 
POTENCIAL EMPLOYEES 
You have been randomly selected as a potential employee. Your first task is to fill out the 
personality test provided. Please answer the questions from your personal perspective, by writing 
1-5 in the space provided, to what degree that statement applies to you. Depending on these 
results, the managers will choose to recommend you for hire or not.  Please answer all questions 
seriously and honestly. Your answers to the questionnaires as well as during the subsequent 
experiments will of course be treated anonymously.  
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GIVEN EMPLOYEE 
You have been randomly selected as an employee. As mentioned in the first part of the 
instructions you are an employee in a company that has two vacancies which are going to be 
filled in the first part of the experiment. As part of your job you will be asked to do a task which 
will be evaluated by the manager. The task will involve reading a case study and answering 2 
questions related to it. The manager is then going to evaluate your answers. At the end you will 
be asked to evaluate the performance of the remaining two employees in your company. Your 
final payment is going to be based on the manager’s evaluation of your answers as well as his 
evaluation of your colleagues, the new employees that are going to be hired in the first part of the 
experiment. More precisely 36 euros are going to be split between all 3 employees working for 
each manager. The split is going to be relative to how well the manager has evaluated you in 
comparison to the other 2 employees. Remember that the minimum you can receive is 5 euros. 
MANAGERS 
As all managers in this experiment you are a new middle-level manager in your company. There 
is already one employee working in your department, who has been hired by your predecessor. 
However there are still are two positions open in your department. Your task as manager will be 
to recommend one person to hire; who you think would do the best job in your department. The 
tool that is given to you to possibly help you make this decision is a personality questionnaire 
that the potential employees have filled.  Further you will be asked to evaluate the task 
performance of all your employees, according to which they will be paid.   
3. AFTER PERSONALITY TEST 
MANAGERS 
Step 1 -Your first task as manager is to hire a potential employee. Six people have applied for the 
job. As you know, they have been asked to do a personality test. You are now required to 
recommend which applicant you want to hire, based on their personality test questionnaire and 
the actual personality test results.  
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So please wait for all candidates to answer the personality tests. Then please make a 
recommendation as to who you would like to hire. That person will be hired into your company. 
Even though there are two vacancies in your department you only have the right to recommend 
one person. 
After recommending a person for hire, and having handed in your recommendation sheet you 
may go on to step two. 
4. AFTER SELECTION AND ASSIGNMENT 
RECOMMENDED EMPLOYEES 
Congratulations, you have been recommended for hire by one of the managers, and have been 
hired in a company. One more employee has been hired into the company along with you, who 
hasn’t been recommended by the manager in this experiment.  
NOT RECCOMENDED EMPLOYEES 
Even though you were no directly recommended for hire by any of the managers you have been 
hired into a company. Congratulations. One more employee has been hired into the company 
along with you, who has been recommended by the manager in this experiment.  
ALL EMPLOYEES  
As part of your job you will be asked to do a task which will be evaluated by the hiring manager. 
The task will involve reading a case study and answering 2 questions related to it. Later you will 
be asked to evaluate the performance of the remaining two employees in your company. Your 
final payment is going to be based on the manager’s evaluation of your answers as well as his 
evaluation of your colleagues, the newly hired that was recommended by the manager and the 
existing employee. More precisely 24 euros are going to be split between all 3 employees 
working for each manager. The split is not going to be in equal shares but relative to how well 
the manager has evaluated you in comparison to the other 2 employees.  Remember that the 
minimum you can receive is 5 euros 
Employees please read carefully the case study presented and on the answer sheets provided 
answer the 2 questions at the end of the case study to the best of your ability.  
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MANAGERS 
Please find the case study provided to you and read it carefully.  
[IN EXPERIENCE TREATMENT 
Now you are required to answer the two questions concerning the case study to the best of your 
ability.] 
You will soon receive 2 questions and answers regarding this case study from all three of your 
employees. Based on this you will have to evaluate your employees. With the Q&A of your 
employees you will receive an evaluation sheet where you need to write the evaluation score for 
each of your employees.  
5. AFTER CASE ANSWERS 
ALL EMPLOYEES: 
You are now required to evaluate the performance of your two co-employees. Wait to receive 
their case study answers and evaluate each person with a total score from 0 to 100 based on the 
answers given. Remember that your final payment doesn’t depend on the peer to peer evaluation 
but solely on how the manager evaluates you. 
MANAGERS 
You are now required to evaluate the performance of your employees in their answers to the case 
study. You are to give each employee a score from 0-100. Your employee’s payment depends on 
your evaluation. Precisely 36 euros are going to be split between all 3 employees working for 
you. The split is not going to be in equal shares but relative to their performance, meaning how 
you evaluate the task they have just done. 
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Appendix B. Personality Questionnaire 
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Appendix C.  Case Study 
 
The Spanish company Lladró was born in 1953 when Juan, José and Vicente Lladró , three 
brothers, sons of farmers with great artistic talent , founded a small family business in the 
Valencian town of Almácera . Lladró since then has undergone a huge metamorphosis from a 
craft workshop to a large international company in continuous expansion. 
Company management, as in its origins, is under the control of the members of the Lladró 
family, who owns the company. Initially, the team just tried to adapt a vintage style, but in a 
short time certain traits appeared that would be recognized later on as the Lladró style. Since the 
beginning, the public was infatuated with their creations. In little time the workshop was 
expanded several times and an increasing number of collaborators multiplied the work of the 
brothers. As of today sculptures which are born in the City of Porcelain do so in a completely 
handmade process in which 2500 employees participate, exporting to more than 120 countries of 
five continents: the Netherlands, USA, United Kingdom and Japan being the most important. 
Since 1955, year in which the first shop was opened in Valencia, Lladró has been increasing its 
network of stores in all major shopping malls in the world: Valencia , Madrid , London, New 
York , Beverly Hills , Singapore , Hong Kong, Las Vegas , Sydney . 6,900 authorized dealers 
exhibit art of Lladró porcelain. 
However, the company’s large expansion has a point of inflection at the end of 2001, when the 
Lladró announced the closing of 2,000 points of sale. In this way Lladró got rid of those dealers 
who were not taking care of the luxury image of its figures, and were exhibiting them together 
them with figures of the competition and even with imitations. The objective of this measure, 
with an effect of decreasing its billing by 17%, is to prove the company’s commitment to quality, 
instead of quantity. 
To recover from this measure, Lladró has put together an expansion plan consisting in opening 
50 own points of sale to sell its new and innovative designs and to create a new image for the 
firm. This strategy will allow the firm to have a direct contact with its customers and it will 
complement the already established relationship with collectors through the Prestige Club 
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Lladró, allowing them to access exclusive collections and having privileged shopping options of 
limited edition products. 
Among the objectives of this plan, one should point out the reinforcement of the quality image of 
the organization, the increase the value of sales by 9% of billings and the maintenance of the 
return on sales. 
QUESTIONS: 
1. - Discuss the relationship between quantity and quality. Is it always an inverse relationship? 
2 . - What objectives Lladró pursues with the expansion plan based on Lladro’s own shopping 
points? Would it be possible to attain these objectives with external distributors? 
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Appendix D.  Average Evaluations by External Evaluator and Session. 
 
 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6
External 1 72,00 65,00 68,45 68,00 64,55 80,27
External 2 57,50 51,82 48,27 57,73 52,73 53,64
External 3 50,50 47,73 48,18 58,64 48,64 52,73
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1 2 3 4 5 6
External 2 66,36 55,45 55,45 60,09 60,00 62,73
External 4 37,64 53,82 53,82 55,55 52,18 52,00
External 5 45,45 61,36 55,45 64,00 65,45 65,00
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Appendix E 
 
Figures F1 & F2 
 
 
 
Figures F3 & F4 
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Figures F5 & F6 
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